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NO. 37 SEPTEMBER 2018 Introduction 
Russia-Israel Relationship 
Transformed by Syria Conflict 
Political Interests Overshadow Social and Economic Ties 
Lidia Averbukh and Margarete Klein 
Recent months have witnessed a warming of relations between Russia and Israel. One 
indicator of the trend is the frequency of high-level meetings, culminating in Prime 
Minister Netanyahu’s participation – as the only Western state guest – in the military 
parade on Red square on 9 May. Alongside existing social ties and economic cooper-
ation, the prospect of a recalibration of Russian policy in Syria to take greater account 
of Israeli security interests has been another important driver. Nevertheless, the 
Russian-Israeli relationship remains constrained and volatile. For Moscow it is just 
one element of a multivectoral Middle East policy. 
 
When Russia emerged from the collapsing 
USSR in December 1991 it inherited a 
fraught relationship with Israel. Although 
the Soviet Union had been one of the first 
countries to recognise Israel in 1948, rela-
tions cooled rapidly in the shadow of the 
Cold War. While the new state of Israel 
leaned heavily towards the United States, 
Moscow expanded relations with its Arab 
neighbours. The Kremlin broke diplomatic 
ties entirely after the Six-Day War in 1967; 
they were only restored in October 1991, 
and subsequently continued by the Russian 
Federation. Since then the two sides have 
successively deepened their relationship on 
the societal, economic and political levels. 
Russia’s military intervention in the Syria 
conflict in September 2015 marked a new 
phase in Russian-Israeli relations: They are 
now dominated by questions of order and 
security in the Middle East. In this new 
situation the long-established twin pillars 
of the relationship – social ties and shared 
economic interests – have become second-
ary, and susceptible to instability in the 
event of political crisis. 
Primacy of realpolitik 
Russia and Israel share important aspects 
in their strategic cultures. Both pursue a 
decidedly interest-led realpolitik. Free of 
value-driven concerns, they have no dif-
ficulty pursuing pragmatic selective co-
operation where shared interests exist, even 
if normative differences persist. Both states 
exhibit a siege mentality, and both are 
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guided by the primacy of security and a 
primarily military understanding of power. 
These shared basic tenets mean that each 
side can accept the other’s core interests. 
Where these do not clash with their own 
security needs, Russia and Israel largely 
refrain from criticising the other’s actions, 
or at least desist from backing criticism 
with actions. 
The shared perception of a threat of 
Islamist terrorism since the beginning of 
the century has promoted a Russian-Israeli 
rapprochement. During the Second Intifada 
(2000–2005) then Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon not only held back from criti-
cising human rights violations by Russian 
forces in the Second Chechen War (1999–
2009); in fact he backed the Russian line 
that Chechen separatism was tantamount 
to terrorism and drew parallels to the 
actions of the Palestinians. Israel’s volatile 
security situation also explains why Benja-
min Netanyahu’s government has ex-
pressed no value-based criticism of the 
Russian military intervention in Syria. 
Instead Netanyahu has repeatedly referred 
to the benefits of Russian action against 
Islamist terrorism there. In view of the 
massive US and EU condemnation of Rus-
sian over Chechnya and Syria, Israel’s 
stance is a political gain for Moscow, 
helping to uphold the Kremlin’s narrative 
of leading the fight against international 
terrorism. At the same time Moscow can 
exploit its understanding with Israel – as 
a Western ally – internally, to brush aside 
the impression that Russia has been iso-
lated by the entire Western community. 
Avoiding isolation by the West is especially 
important for Moscow during the crisis over 
Ukraine. Ultimately, Israel declined to par-
ticipate in sanctions imposed by the EU and 
the United States in response to the annexa-
tion of Crimea and the destabilisation of 
Donbas. 
For the sake of Russian coordination over 
vital security questions, the Israeli leader-
ship is prepared to implicitly recognise core 
Russian interests in Russia’s post-Soviet 
neighbourhood. Conversely, since about the 
turn of the century Moscow has tended to 
take significant – although not equal – 
account of Israeli standpoints. While Russia 
continues to criticise Israel’s actions in Gaza 
and the West Bank, its tone has softened. 
Above all, Moscow no longer clearly takes 
the side of the Palestinian leadership. Even 
if individual voices in Russia call for a 
revival of the traditional partnership with 
Arab nations, President Vladimir Putin in 
particular wishes to avoid side-taking that 
would risk the existing cordial relations 
with the region’s strongest military power. 
Even more so since the Russian interven-
tion in the Syria conflict in September 
2015. Instead the Russian leadership is 
seeking to use its established ties with the 
Palestinians and improving relations with 
Israel to position itself as a mediator. That 
is a course compatible with the pragmatic, 
non-ideological realpolitik Moscow is pur-
suing across the Middle East. 
Social ties 
When Putin visited Israel in 2005 (as the 
first Russian president to do so) he empha-
sised the historic and cultural ties between 
the two nations. Indeed, the development 
of societal aspects since the resumption of 
relations has played a large part in bringing 
Russia and Israel closer together. 
Ever since he assumed office, Putin has 
presented himself as the protector of the 
Jewish minority in Russia and in Europe as 
a whole. In so doing, he alludes in particu-
lar to the Soviet Union’s struggle against 
fascism – as demonstrated by his visits to 
Holocaust memorials and meetings with 
Russian-Jewish veterans of the Second World 
War. The world’s largest Jewish Museum 
opened in Moscow in 2012. In the course 
of the so-called migration crisis Putin called 
on Jews living in Western Europe to emi-
grate to Russia to escape the growing anti-
Semitism. The 2016 Russian-Israeli decla-
ration for the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations 
also acknowledged the important role 
played by the Jewish population in Russian 
history and culture. 
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Outside the political elites, a growth in 
positive attitudes towards Israel can also 
be observed in Russian society. Despite pro-
nounced everyday anti-Semitism, a Levada 
survey in 2017 found that 57 percent of 
Russians had a positive or very positive 
attitude towards Israel; for the European 
Union and the United States the figures 
were 39 and 37 percent. Whereas anti-
Semitism in European societies is often 
closely bound up with anti-Israel stances, 
this is not true of Russia, and the boycott 
movement (BDS), which is gaining influ-
ence in the Western world, is a non-issue. 
One reason is the sympathy for Israel as 
a militarily and economically highly 
advanced nation – a picture presented by 
media and the political leadership. Another 
is the role played by growing private con-
tacts and informal exchange between the 
two societies. Israel has become a popular 
destination for Russian holidaymakers 
and medical tourists. Visa-free travel, the 
prevalence of the Russian language and 
the decline in travel to traditional holiday 
centres in Turkey and Egypt are among 
the reasons why 331,500 Russian citizens 
visited Israel in 2017; a 26 percent increase 
compared to 2016. Visits by Russian Ortho-
dox pilgrims have also increased since 
2008, when Sergei’s Courtyard – as part 
of the Russian Compound in Jerusalem – 
was returned to the Moscow Patriarch. 
Social and cultural ties between Russia 
and Israel have also been boosted by Jewish 
emigration to Israel. Aggregated migration 
from Tsarist Russia, the USSR and its suc-
cessor states accounts for 15 percent of 
Israel’s population – and 25 percent of its 
Jewish population. So it should be no sur-
prise if this immigration has shaped Israel 
both culturally and politically. The family 
roots of most Israeli prime ministers to date 
lie within the territory of the former Rus-
sian Empire. 
The consolidation of social ties between 
Russia and Israel in recent decades is attrib-
utable in particular to the immigration of 
approximately one million Jews who moved 
to Israel from the collapsing Soviet Union 
in the 1990s – and are commonly referred 
to simply as “the Russians”. These individu-
als were politically and culturally socialised 
in the USSR or the new Russia. They re-
main, despite being comparatively highly 
qualified, largely segregated from the rest 
of the Israeli population in geographical as 
well as socio-economic terms. This is the 
group Putin is talking about when he refers 
to “our compatriots” with “our mentality”. 
It is distinct from another set of recent 
immigrants who moved to Israel after the 
annexation of Crimea for political or eco-
nomic reasons. For many – especially the 
young and well-educated – Israel is merely 
a staging post en route to another Western 
destination. Others, with an eye to Western 
sanctions and political uncertainty, seek 
dual citizenship. An Israeli passport offers 
visa-free entry to 105 states (compared to 
79 with a Russian passport) and years of tax 
breaks following naturalisation. Israel’s 
economic benefit from this type of immi-
gration explains why it waives the usual 
qualification periods and residency require-
ments in certain cases, such as the oligarch 
Roman Abramovich. 
In view of the “compatriots” policy 
eagerly pursued by the Kremlin, fears have 
been expressed in Israeli media that Mos-
cow could use Israel’s Russian-speaking 
population for its own political ends. Even 
if Russia has had some successes with this 
strategy in certain post-Soviet states, the 
prospects of its replication in Israel are 
remote. Russian-speaking Israelis represent 
15 percent of the Israeli electorate, and 
have the potential to determine the fate 
of 18 of the 120 Knesset seats (which can 
easily be decisive in a coalition system). 
They tend to vote for Israel our Home, 
the clientele party of the Russian speaking 
immigrants. The group, however, had 
developed a strong Israeli identity. Also 
their diverse background mitigate against 
the possibility of being used by Moscow. 
Although their roots in the former Soviet 
Union define the space they occupy within 
Israeli society, they see themselves first as 
Israeli citizens. One relevant piece of evi-
dence is the low rate of participation in 
Russian elections by the 50,000 Israelis who 
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also possess a Russian passport. Only 8 per-
cent of them voted in the Russian presiden-
tial election in March 2018. 
The attitude of Russian-speaking Israelis 
towards the Russian leadership is also very 
ambivalent. This is partly attributable to 
the experience of the Jewish minority in 
the Soviet Union – which was for decades 
permitted neither to practice their religion 
nor to emigrate. Another relevant aspect is 
that many of these individuals originate not 
from Russia itself, but from the territory of 
what is now Ukraine and other states linked 
to the former USSR. Russia’s military 
actions in 2008 in Georgia and since 2014 
in Ukraine have further widened the con-
tradictions within this group. Many immi-
grants from the territory of the former 
Soviet Union do use Russian-language 
media as a source of information, but in 
Israel these represent a broader political 
spectrum. In other words, merely using 
Russian-language media is not automatically 
an indicator of openness to Kremlin influ-
ence. 
These deep societal connections have 
helped the Russian and Israeli leaderships 
to advance their – primarily politically 
motivated – rapprochement process. But 
they are not the main driver of the relation-
ship. The connections are stronger on the 
Israeli side, but their political effect is lim-
ited by ambivalences within the group of 
Russian-speaking Israelis. On the Russian 
side in turn, societal factors generally play 
no role in the formulation of foreign policy. 
Instead, references to shared history and 
culture by Russia’s leadership serve its rep-
resentation as a friend of Israel. Seen from 
that perspective, the social ties between 
Russia and Israel would not be strong 
enough to soften a crisis in political rela-
tions. 
Economic interests 
The resumption of diplomatic relations 
between Russia and Israel laid the founda-
tions for economic cooperation. At first the 
question was simply to get trade started, for 
example with a trade agreement (1994) and 
an agreement on cooperation in science 
and technology (1994). In the past decade 
the two states have increased their coopera-
tion in specific sectors, as reflected in agree-
ments on space research (2011), nuclear 
technology (2013) and nano-technology 
(2016). Since 2016 negotiations have also 
been under way on a free trade agreement 
between the Eurasian Economic Union – 
the Russian-led economic integration proj-
ect with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia 
and Belarus – and Israel. 
Trade has grown enormously since the 
restoration of relations, reaching a volume 
of $2.5 billion in 2017 – with Israel over-
taking Iran ($1.7 billion); but Israel’s share 
of Russia’s foreign trade is still just 0.4 per-
cent – and far behind Russia’s most im-
portant Middle Eastern partner Turkey 
($20.9 billion). 
While Russia largely exports resources 
to Israel (40 percent oil, 32 percent precious 
metals), its main imports are agricultural 
products (36 percent), machines (28 percent) 
and chemicals (22 percent). The figures 
indicate that Israel has been profiting in-
directly from Russian counter-sanctions 
on European agricultural products. 
The main potential for Russian-Israeli 
trade relations achieving strategic signifi-
cance lies in energy and high-tech. Since 
the discovery of the Leviathan gas field off 
the Israeli coast in 2010, Russian firms have 
been seeking to participate in the explora-
tion rights. Russia wants to secure a share 
of the Israeli energy market and influence 
the EU’s energy diversification efforts in the 
eastern Mediterranean. 
Russia eyes Israel as a potential moderni-
sation partner in the field of high-tech. Co-
operation agreements have been established 
between Israeli firms and research insti-
tutes and the Russian state nano-technology 
institute Rosnano (2012) and the Russian 
innovation centre Skolkovo (2016). Israel’s 
start-up scene makes it an attractive partner 
for Russian economic modernisation, espe-
cially in view of the impact of sanctions 
on exchange with other Western countries. 
But for cooperation to take place the 
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private sector in Russia would have to get 
on board the currently state-driven projects. 
The dearth of private sector commitment 
to date is reflected in low levels of direct 
investment between the two states: in 2017 
just $570 million in Israel and $480 million 
in Russia. 
At the same time Russia and Israel are 
rivals in the global arms markets. Moscow 
traditionally supplies Israel’s Arab neigh-
bours and Iran. Israel has in recent years 
exported increasing amounts of arms and 
matériel to post-Soviet states, especially 
Azerbaijan. Technological cooperation 
between the Russian and Israeli defence 
sectors has been very limited to date: the 
production of Israeli drones for the Russian 
armed forces was terminated in the course 
of the Ukraine crisis. This demonstrates the 
narrow limits that still apply to cooperation 
in the sensitive field of security, especially 
in light of Israel’s close and deep security 
partnership with the United States. 
Even if the two states have expanded 
their bilateral trade, the economic pillar 
of the relationship is without strategic 
significance. Development potential does 
exist within several branches, and if fully 
utilised could make Israel a partner for 
Russia’s modernisation. But such a scenario 
is hindered by obstacles on the Russian 
side: weakness of innovation, lack of legal 
certainty, strong dependency on the state. 
For its part, Israel has security concerns, 
above all in the energy and defence sectors. 
The Syria conflict as stress test 
Military intervention in Syria in September 
2015 opened a new phase in Russia’s Middle 
East policy in general and Moscow’s rela-
tions with Israel in particular. Relations 
with Israel now require greater coordina-
tion and are characterised by greater fra-
gility. The conflict dynamic in Syria and the 
associated questions of regional order and 
security represent a stress test for the Rus-
sian-Israeli relationship. 
De-conflicting 
Russia’s intervention in Syria created a 
need on both sides to avoid unintentional 
military clashes by establishing functioning 
communication channels and dependable 
arrangements. To this end the two armed 
forces set up a de-conflicting mechanism in 
autumn 2015. It is embedded in a format 
of frequent high-level discussions between 
the Russian president and the Israeli prime 
minister, as well as between the defence 
ministers and intelligence service chiefs. 
The mechanism permitted Israel to conduct 
air strikes on Hezbollah positions and con-
voys without interference by Russian air 
defence. The Israeli leadership’s assurance 
that it was interested only in the threat 
from pro-Iranian forces – and not in top-
pling Assad – was crucial for Moscow’s 
consent to the arrangement. Unlike the 
Russian-Turkish relationship, which was 
plunged into deep crisis by the shooting 
down of a Russian warplane in November 
2015, Russian-Israeli relations long re-
mained unproblematic even as both oper-
ated militarily in Syria. But as the conflict 
progressed the de-conflicting mechanism 
came under pressure. Israel’s threat per-
ception and strategy changed after Assad 
and his allies recaptured large parts of 
Syria. Netanyahu’s government is now con-
cerned that Tehran is establishing a perma-
nent military presence in Syria, especially 
along the border to Israel. In order to pre-
vent this, Israel seems to have shifted from 
a policy of containing pro-Iranian forces 
through isolated air strikes to one of driving 
its forces out of Syria by military means, 
and greatly expanded its air strikes on Syrian 
territory from February 2018. In the process 
Israeli also targeted positions of significance 
for Russia’s military operation: In February 
2018, following a drone attack attributed to 
pro-Iranian forces and the downing of an 
Israeli warplane by the Syrian air force, the 
Israeli air force struck a base in Syria (T4), 
where Russian military advisors were also 
present. This plunged the hitherto informal 
arrangement with Russia into crisis. The 
Russian military leadership sharply criti-
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cised Israel’s actions, and floated the idea 
of responding by supplying the S-300 anti-
aircraft system to the Syrian armed forces. 
That would have meant Russia abandoning 
its long-standing line of observing vital 
Israeli interests in its arms supplies to Syria. 
It took a face-to-face meeting between 
Putin and Netanyahu in May 2018 in Mos-
cow to defuse the crisis. Russia not only 
withdrew its threat to supply Syria with 
S-300 batteries; even more importantly Mos-
cow now tolerates Israel’s tougher strategy 
against pro-Iranian forces in Syria. Putin 
and Netanyahu appear to have agreed that 
Moscow will accept Israeli air strikes against 
pro-Iranian combatants not only along 
Syria’s southern border but also in its inte-
rior. So the Kremlin refrained from criti-
cising Israeli air strikes on Syrian territory 
the day after Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow, 
which were the largest since 1973. And in 
return Israel raised no objections to the 
Syrian army’s military offensive with Rus-
sian air support in the southern deescala-
tion zone. Putin also expressed understand-
ing for Israeli’s demand for the withdrawal 
of Iranian forces from Syria. Whereas in 
November 2017 Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov was still describing the presence of 
Iranian fighters in Syria as legitimate, at a 
meeting with Assad on 17 May 2018 Putin 
called for the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Syria after “the launch of an 
active phase of a political process” – with 
the exception of Russia which is there at 
the invitation of the Syrian regime. Both 
developments suggest a partial recalibra-
tion of Russia’s policy on Syria, with greater 
willingness to take account of Israeli secu-
rity interests. This reflects the priority 
placed by the Russian leadership on safe-
guarding its own armed forces in Syria: In 
the event of an escalation Israel would be 
capable of significantly complicating the 
military situation for Russia. Moscow also 
expects Israel’s cooperation when it comes 
to shaping a new Syrian political order. 
The Iran factor 
Russia’s tacit acceptance of Israeli air strikes 
in Syria and its change in rhetoric towards 
the Iranian military presence reflect a con-
cern that Washington might abandon the 
restraint it has shown if the Israeli-Iranian 
conflict were to escalate in Syria. A serious 
US military intervention could gravely 
endanger the military and political gains 
Russia has achieved to date. 
The outward convergence with Israel also 
reflects a growing rivalry between Russia 
and Iran in Syria. The more Assad regains 
his grip on power, the more pressing the 
question of Syria’s future political and eco-
nomic order. Moscow and Tehran are set 
under this scenario to compete over eco-
nomic advantage and political influence. 
At the same time the two countries remain 
militarily dependent on one another in 
Syria. The Russian military intervention is 
largely restricted to its air force with limited 
participation by ground forces (special 
forces, military police (in particular from 
Chechnya) and mercenaries), any stabilisa-
tion of Assad’s rule will require the assis-
tance of the pro-Iranian forces present in 
Syria. The state of the Syrian army offers 
little grounds to believe that it could soon 
take over the military tasks hitherto under-
taken by pro-Iranian forces. A meaningful 
weakening of the groups supported by Teh-
ran would therefore automatically demand 
greater military engagement by Russia – 
which President Putin would be keen to 
avoid for domestic political reasons. 
Moscow has no immediate interest in 
massively weakening Iran in Syria, nor 
would it be in any position to do so. How-
ever Russia appears willing to exert a mod-
erating influence on Tehran and Hezbollah 
and establish a buffer zone in southern 
Syria, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
declaring in July 2018 that only the Syrian 
army should be operating in regions border-
ing Israel and Jordan. According to media 
reports Lavrov offered Israel support for 
a withdrawal of Iranian and pro-Iranian 
forces to at least one hundred kilometres 
from the Israeli border. It is unclear whether 
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Moscow could guarantee such a buffer 
zone, and anyway Israel had rejected the 
proposal as inadequate. It should be noted 
that Russia does not share Israel’s interest 
in driving Tehran completely out of Syria 
and massively weakening Iranian influence 
in the Middle East as a whole. Moscow’s 
return to the region is predicated above 
all on its ability to maintain good relations 
with all parties, especially those that are 
hostile to one another. Being courted by all 
sides is what could potentially make Russia 
the region’s most important “go-to-power”. 
For that to occur it requires leverage in all 
directions. It is this realpolitik that would 
deter Moscow from siding firmly with Israel. 
Selective cooperation with 
clear limits 
Russia’s rapprochement with Israel is still 
far from a strategic partnership based on 
shared goals and mutual trust. The relation-
ship between the two countries remain 
highly pragmatic, interest-driven and marked 
by selective cooperation. The relationship is 
currently driven by the Syria conflict and 
other developments in the Middle East, 
while specific social and economic ties are 
less decisive. In the event of a security con-
flict – for example over Syria or Iran –
Russia and Israel might not be able to pre-
vent a deterioration of ties. 
The limits of Russian overtures to Israel 
are clearly visible. They lie in the unpredict-
able conflict dynamic in Syria and the 
diverging interests concerning the roles of 
Iran and the United States in the region. If 
Moscow succeeds in satisfying Israeli secu-
rity needs by keeping pro-Iranian forces out 
of southern Syria this would foster trust on 
the Israeli side. At the same time it would 
be conceivable for that scenario to lead to 
a – very limited – improvement in the 
Russian-American relationship. If the idea 
of a buffer zone fails and Israel decides to 
strike massively at pro-Iranian forces across 
Syria – potentially accompanied by a sig-
nificant US military engagement – the 
Russian-Israeli relationship could quickly 
cool. Such a development would threaten 
Russian’s core interest in the region: to pre-
serve the military and political successes 
achieved to date in Syria and in the Middle 
East more broadly. 
Options for Germany and the EU exist but 
are limited. On the one hand, they do share 
interests with Russia. Both sides would like 
to avoid a military escalation on the Israeli-
Iranian front. Russia is currently the actor 
best able to avert escalation, on account of 
its military presence on the ground and its 
established communication channels both 
to the Israeli leadership and to Hezbollah 
and Tehran. On the other hand, in view of 
the damage to overall trust caused by the 
crisis over Ukraine and diverging interests 
in relation to the future order for Syria, 
Germany and the EU face serious obstacles 
in achieving any coordinated action with 
Russia. Besides, Germany and the EU would 
not be Russia’s preferred key partner. As 
revealed at the Helsinki summit between 
Putin and Trump in July 2018, Moscow 
would prefer to use its special position in 
Syria and the Middle East and its direct line 
to Israel for a possible rapprochement with 
the Trump administration. 
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